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At the last session the legislature effected a conspicuous
change with respect to the rights of contribution among solidary
tortfeasors. Formerly the Louisiana law on this subject differed
in only one respect from the majority common law position
which wholly denies the right of one tortfeasor to contribution
from another who was jointly liable for the same harm.' In this
state if the victim actually secured a solidary judgment against
both wrongdoers, one of them, by satisfying the judgment, was
entitled to proceed against the other for his pro rata share. But
a solidary judgment against both defendants was essential.2
As a result, the right to contribution depended upon the caprice
of the victim who was free to proceed against both, or either.
Article 2103 of the Civil Code has now been amended so as
to read as follows:
"When two or more debtors are liable in solido, whether
the obligation arises from a contract, a quasi contract, an
offense, or a quasi offense, it should be divided between them.
As between the solidary debtors, each is liable only for his
virile portion of the obligation.
"A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it
exists, is solidary may seek to enforce contribution, if he is
cast, against his solidary co-debtor by making him a third
party defendant in the suit, as provided in Articles 1111
through 1116 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether or not
the third party defendant was sued by the plaintiff initially,
and whether the defendant seeking to enforce contribution
if he is cast admits or denies liability on the obligation sued
on by the plaintiff. ' '8
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The leading common law case is Merryweather v. Nixon, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337
(1799). 1 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.2 (1956). It is important
to note, however, that almost half the common law states have statutes permitting
contribution under varied circumstances.
2. Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
DeJean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936). The same result is produced by con-
tribution statutes in Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, Texas and West Virginia.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.
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As I understand this provision, a tortfeasor whose liability
is in fact solidary can, upon satisfying more than his pro rata
share of the claim, proceed for contribution against the other
solidary obligor or obligors. Judged in the light of the juris-
prudence prior to the amendment and assuming that the pur-
pose of the new provision is to be gathered from a perusal of
both paragraphs, it is not unlikely that it will be construed as
entitling one solidary tortfeasor to claim contribution only in
the instance where a suit for damages has been instituted against
him and when he faces the prospect of a judgment subjecting
him to liability for the entire claim. The language of the amend-
ment, however, is also susceptible to the interpretation that
the right to contribution arises whenever there is solidary tort
liability irrespective of whether or not this liability is ever re-
duced to a judgment in favor of the victim.4 Under this view
the tortfeasor who has satisfied the claim through compromise
would have a claim for contribution. In this connection it is note-
worthy that the contribution claim of the settling tortfeasor is
expressly recognized in the Model Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act,f, which deliberately includes the phrase,
"whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some
of them."
Since this latter suggested interpretation would have con-
siderable support in policy and would be entirely rational from
the language of the Louisiana provision, it may be profitable to
conjecture concerning the problems that could arise should it be
adopted.
In each of the following instances it may be assumed that A
and B have injured X through their combined tortious conduct
and that X has lost wages, incurred medical bills, and has ex-
perienced pain and suffering.
(1) X makes a settlement with A, who pays $5,000 in re-
turn for a release in which X reserves the right to proceed
against B.0 A then files suit for pro rata contribution against B.
4. This conclusion is based upon the assumption that the defendants become
solidary debtors whenever the victim's cause of action against them arises, and
that a plaintiff judgment is merely the means of enforcing the obligation and is
not a condition precedent to the existence of the obligation itself.
5. 9 U.L.A. 156, § 1 (1951).
6. Note that in some states the statute provides that one tortfeasor who pays
through voluntary settlement is entitled to proceed for contribution if his co-
wrongdoer is also released 'by the settlement, but not otherwise. Trampe v, Wis-
consin Tel. Co., 214 Wis. 210, 252 N.W. 675 (1934). This is also true under the
Uniform Act, note 5 supra.
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Presumably A must establish both that he (A) was liable for
damages to X and also that B was solidarily liable with him. He
must also show that the damages that would have been assessable
in favor of X would have equaled or exceeded $5,000 if he is to
secure full contribution of B's pro rata share of $2,500. 7 The
showing that he must make in this independent claim for contri-
bution is substantially the same that would have been required
of X if the latter had sued both A and B for damages. If, follow-
ing A's recovery from B, X thereafter institutes suit against B, B
is presumably liable for any damages in excess of $5,000, and B
can make a call upon A as a third party defendant. For example,
if the total damage is found to be $10,000, B can be held to X
for $5,000 ($10,000 less the $5,000 already paid by A). B will
then be entitled to a judgment over against A for $2,500 upon
satisfaction of X's claim. Each party will have paid $5,000 (his
virile share of the total liability). A's original settlement will
not have afforded him protection against B's later claim for
contribution.
(2) Suppose the same set of facts, except that X, after hav-
ing settled with A for $5,000, as above, now separately settles
with and releases B for $1,000. What are the respective rights
of A and B against each other? Are we to assume that each is
entitled from the other to one-half of what he has paid? If so, A
will be entitled to $2,500, and B will be entitled to $500, leaving
a net difference owed by B to A of $2,000. This must be true
even though as a result A will not receive a full one-half of what
he paid X in settlement. The reason is that A, with reference to
B, did not discharge the full solidary obligation ($6,000) by pay-
ment to X. Hence, he must surrender to B one-half of the latter's
payment which discharges the remainder of the solidary debt.
Of course, it must appear in the suit for contribution that at
least a total of $6,000 was owed to X by the solidary obligors.
If it had been made to appear by A that X's damages were only
$5,000, then A, by the compromise payment, discharged the
entire obligation and B's later payment was "by mistake," thus
entitling him to no contribution.
It is noteworthy that several contribution statutes do not
7. If the amount of the solidary liability to X established in the contribution
claim is less than the amount paid by A in settlement, A should still recover one
half of the amount for which both could have been held. For example, if the
total liability were found to be only $2,500, A's recovery against B should be$1,250, because A, having discharged the obligation in full, has placed B in the
position where, in any suit by X, he can set up A's payment in full satisfaction.
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entitle a solidary obligor to claim contribution unless he paid
the common claim pursuant to a judgment in favor of the victim
of the tort. This has the advantage of simplicity, since the ques-
tions of liability, damage, and right to contribution will neces-
sarily be determined in a single proceding (under modern third
party practice rules). But it is also to be considered that this
position may substantially deter the making of amicable settle-
ments, for the settling defendant deprives himself of all rights
to contribution. It is noteworthy, however, that even under the
Louisiana procedure one of two or more solidary defendants who
settles may still thereafter remain subject himself to a claim for
contribution if the remaining solidary tortfeasor later pays by
way of settlement or pursuant to judgment. His only protection
here is either to insist that all possible defendants participate
in the settlement, or to insist in his private settlement that a
release be given to all parties who may be solidarily responsible.
The recognition of a tortfeasor's claim to contribution would
seem to make it highly advisable in the interest of fairness that
contributory negligence be abandoned and that comparative neg-
ligence be substituted in lieu thereof. A moment's reflection will
show why this is so. Assume that an automobile accident is
attributable to the combined negligence of A, B, and C. Only A,
however, is injured. If the principle underlying contribution
(equality of burdens and damages) were applied, each of the
three parties who were equally at fault should shoulder his
virile share of the damage incurred. The proper solution, then,
would be that A's damages should be reduced by one-third be-
cause of his own contributing fault, and that the cost of the
remaining two-thirds should ultimately rest in equal shares upon
B and C. But, under the doctrine of contributory negligence, A,
despite the contributing faults of B and C, must shoulder the
entire loss himself. The only justification that can be asserted
for this incongruous conclusion is that A's negligence contributed
to his own injury, rather than to an injury to B or C. Once the
legislature has recognized the principle of apportionment of loss
between the wrongdoers, it is difficult to appreciate how the
courts could fail to apply the same principle to the negligent
victim as well as to negligent co-defendants.
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVORSHIP OF TORT CLAIMS
Article 2315 was amended at the last session of the legisla-
ture so as to effect one important change and also to simplify
19601
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI
and make clearer the classes of persons designated as claimants
or beneficiaries.8  Formerly the death of a beneficiary of a
wrongful death claim prior to final judgment served to extin-
guish the claim completely. The right of the beneficiary is by
the amendment designated a "property right, which, on the death
of the survivor in whose favor the right of action survived, is
inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit
has been instituted thereon by the survivor or not." 9
8. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it.
"The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi
offense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his
legal instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the surviving
spouse.
"The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense,
if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of
the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the de-
ceased, or either such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father
and mother of the deceased, or either.of htem, if he left no spouse or child surviv-
ing; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if
he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving. The survivors in whose favor this right
of action survives may also recover the damages which they sustained through
the wrongful death of the deceased. A right to recover damages under the pro-
visions of this paragraph is a property right which, on the death of the survivor
in whose favor the right of action survived, is inherited by his legal, instituted,
or irregular heirs, whether suit has been instituted thereon by the survivor or not.
"As used in this article, the words 'child,' 'brother,' 'sister,' 'father,' and
'mother' includes a child, brother, sister, father, and mother, by adoption, re-
spectively. (As amended Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.)
9. LA. COvIL CODF art. 231.5 (1870), as amended, by La. Acts 1960, No. 30,
§1.
